WAIT…WHAT DID I JUST SAY?: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO BE
CONCERNED ABOUT WHEN ISSUING THIRD-PARTY CLOSING
OPINIONS
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INTRODUCTION
No matter what your mother says, it is not always better to give than to
receive. Opinion letters are concrete proof. Opinion letters ―provide[ ] the opinion
recipient with the opinion giver‘s professional judgment about how the highest court
of the jurisdiction whose law is being addressed would appropriately resolve the
issues covered by the opinion on the date of the opinion letter.‖1 Parties to business
transactions commonly require counsel for the opposing party to opine on ―1) the
‗authority‘ of [their client] to engage in the transaction, 2) the enforceability of the
transaction contracts against [their client], and 3) [whether] the transaction [or their
client] is . . . in violation of any applicable law or contract.‖2 Although opinion
letters have long been routine in business transactions,3 preparing an opinion letter
can still bring anxiety to the hearts of even the most experienced lawyers.4 This
anxiety stems from the liability that an opinion letter can bring upon the issuing
counsel.5
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TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, 53 BUS. LAW. 592, 595-96 (1998)
(emphasis omitted).
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Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path, & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A
Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 62 (2005) (discussing the most popular form of
opinion letters, the third-party closing opinion).
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See id.; Donald W. Glazer, It’s Time to Streamline Opinion Letters: The Chair of a BLS Committee Speaks
Out, BUS. LAW TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 32, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/92opinion.html (discussing the history of opinion letters).
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See Lipson, supra note 2, at 61 (when issuing opinions, ―lawyers conduct themselves as if their
professional lives were on the line‖).
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Generally, there are two types of opinions: first-party opinions and thirdparty opinions.6 A first-party opinion is delivered by an attorney to a client upon the
client‘s request for the lawyer‘s professional judgment on an issue.7 As its name
implies, a third-party opinion is delivered by an attorney to a non-client on a client‘s
behalf.8 Business parties often demand third-party opinions from opposing counsel
as part of due diligence in completing a transaction.9 The TriBar Opinion
Committee describes some common situations in which opinion letters are used:
The relevant agreement in a business transaction will often provide
for delivery of an opinion letter as a condition of closing. In some
cases, such as a loan, the borrower will furnish an opinion letter of its
counsel to the lender. In other cases, such as in some mergers, each
side will furnish an opinion letter of its counsel to the other side.10
Third-party opinions are used by recipients to help ensure that the other party to the
transaction has fulfilled its legal obligations and that there are not any relevant legal
issues of which the recipient is unaware.11 Third-party opinions ―are viewed as a
‗fixture of the American legal scene,‘ and are routinely delivered in financings,
mergers and acquisitions, stock issuances, and other large, complex transactions.‖12
While opinion letters are a routine part of business transactions, 13 lawyers
issuing opinion letters should not take the task lightly.14 Lawyers can be and have
See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1,
9 (2005).
6
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See Lipson, supra note 2, at 116 n.294.

See id. at 61-62; TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 596; Committee on Legal Opinions,
Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law, American
Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167, 169 (1991).
8

Lipson, supra note 2, at 71 (citing Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing
Opinions, 57 BUS. LAW. 875, 875 (2002)).
9
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TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 596.

Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 10-11 (―[T]he inability of counsel to deliver a requested opinion at closing
signals a problem and allows intended opinion recipients to refuse to consummate the transaction.‖);
see Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions, 57 BUS. LAW. 875, 875
(2002).
11

Lipson, supra note 2, at 62. ―Because the transactions requiring third-party legal opinions span the
entire range of business and financial undertakings, such opinions have become far more prevalent
than opinions directed to clients.‖ Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 9.
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See supra text accompanying notes 10-12; Lipson, supra note 1, at 80.
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been sued by third parties for false or misleading statements contained in opinion
letters.15 In fact, many lawyers perceive this risk of liability to be increasing.16 In a
study conducted by Professor Jonathan C. Lipson, ―[m]any of the lawyers
interviewed . . . said that they thought that lawyers were becoming increasingly
attractive litigation targets when transactions failed, and that opinion letters would
form an important link in the chain leading to liability.‖17
Complicating matters, there is little case law governing tort liability arising
from false or misleading opinion letters.18 There is also a lack of academic literature
on the subject, despite the prevalence of opinion letters.19 Other than sporadic case
law and reports from state bar associations, the only major resources on third-party
opinions are an article written by the TriBar Opinion Committee,20 two articles
written by the American Bar Association‘s Section of Business Law, 21 two sections in
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,22 two sections in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,23 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.3,24 and a
treatise by Arthur Norman Field and Jeffrey M. Smith.25

Id. at 102 (―[L]awyers express increasing anxiety about liability for their opinion letters, and find
support for this concern in recent decisions.‖); see Joseph S. Berman, Attorney Opinion Letters, BOSTON
B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 20.
14
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Berman, supra note 14, at 20; see Lipson, supra note 2, at 102-09.

16

Lipson, supra note 2, at 65, 102.

17

Id. at 65.

See id. at 102-05. See generally Berman, supra note 14 (analyzing two seemingly contradictory
Massachusetts cases).
18

Lipson, supra note 2, at 61 (―Few practices among U.S. lawyers are more curious—or (curiously) less
studied by legal scholars.‖); Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 12 (The relevant scholarly literature is . . .
sparse.‖).
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TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 592.

Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11; Committee on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion Principles,
53 BUS. LAW. 831 (1998).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1977).
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ARTHUR NORMAN FIELD & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d
ed. 2007).
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There may be a couple of reasons why there is not highly developed case law
or an extensive amount of scholarly research on third party-opinions. It may be that
most cases against lawyers over faulty opinion letters are settled. Alternatively, there
may not be many of such cases filed.26 Whatever the reason for the dearth of case
law and research on the issue, lawyers are still fearful of potential liability, and many
predict that attorney liability will only increase in the future.27
Perhaps even more troubling than the scarcity of case law, existing case law
on opinion letter liability is sometimes contradictory.28 For example, in April of
2004, one Massachusetts state trial court held that an attorney did not owe a duty of
care to a recipient of a third-party opinion letter because that duty conflicted with
obligations to his client.29 In December of 2004, under similar facts, another
Massachusetts state trial court held that an attorney does owe the recipient of a thirdparty opinion letter a duty of care because the recipient is entitled to rely on the
opinion.30 Thus, even when relevant authority exists, it does not always provide clear
guidance. This Article endeavors to synthesize the lessons from existing case law;
report the trends in opinion letter liability as documented in case law, bar reports,
and scholarly articles; and use those resources to provide guidelines to help lawyers
avoid liability. The law on opinion letters is unsettled,31 but it is possible to discern a
few general rules and to identify some situations where lawyers should explicitly
protect themselves from potential liability.
Part I of this Article discusses the scope of an opinion letter and how and
why opining counsel must define this scope to lessen their chances of liability. Part
II examines the complexities lawyers face when the law that is the subject of the
opinion is unclear or likely to change and suggests how lawyers may safely issue an
See Lipson, supra note 2, at 104-06. ―Many of the lawyers interviewed for this project acknowledged
that they personally knew of no lawyers who had been sued for errors in a third-party closing opinion
and held liable (or settled for more than nominal damages) . . . ‗[o]pinion issues represent a very, very
small number‘ of malpractice claims.‖ Id.
26

Id. at 105 (―[T]he fact that there aren‘t a lot of cases to hold lawyers liable and there isn‘t a lot of
experience of lawyers being sued, doesn‘t mean that people aren‘t fearful of it nevertheless.‖); see supra
text accompanying note 17.
27

28

See Lipson, supra note 2, at 84; supra text accompanying note 18.

Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Apr.
28, 2004); see Berman, supra note 14, at 22.
29

Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. Civ. A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 3019442 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec.
3, 2004); see Berman, supra note 14, at 20-21.
30

31

See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 28-30.
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opinion under those circumstances. Part III lists some subjective terms and phrases
that are commonly used in opinion letters, explains what issues arise when these
terms and phrases are used, and offers ways for lawyers to avoid litigation. Finally,
Part IV explores whether opining counsel owes a duty of care or disclosure to thirdparty opinion recipients.
I. SCOPE OF THE OPINION LETTER
One of the most basic concerns for opinion-giving counsel should be the
scope of the opinion letter.32 A lawyer issuing an opinion should be keenly aware of
what bodies of law are covered by the opinion letter, as those laws define the scope
of the lawyer‘s professional judgment on the issues and will be used to determine
whether that judgment was proper.33 The scope of an opinion letter may be
different, however, if the opinion has adopted the Legal Opinion Accord
(―Accord‖).34 To decrease the risk of liability for an opinion letter, opining counsel
must carefully define the scope of the opinion and understand how the scope may
change if the opinion adopts the Accord.
A. Non-Accord Opinions
In Day v. Dorsey & Whitney,35 plaintiffs sued a law firm and one of its partners
for legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and
consumer fraud resulting from a third-party opinion letter.36 The parties disputed
the areas of law that the firm agreed to cover in the opinion letter.37 Plaintiffs
contracted to buy stock in a subsidiary of the firm‘s client, a gaming corporation.38
As a condition to consummation of the deal, plaintiffs required counsel for the
gaming corporation to issue an opinion as to the validity of both the stock purchase

See TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 597 (―Opinions are often subject to qualifications,
some stated and some not.‖).
32

33

See FIELD & SMITH, supra note 25, at § 3.7; TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 597.

34

See infra text accompanying notes 68-72 (discussing the meaning and effect of the Accord).

No. 98-1425, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2001), aff’d, 21 F.App‘x 530 (8th Cir.
2001).
35

36

Id. at *1.

37

Id. at *5-*6, *20.

38

Id. at *2.
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and the gaming corporation‘s operations under securities law and Indian gaming
law.39
The law firm believed it had been retained solely to address questions
concerning securities law, despite the fact that the firm actually had an Indian gaming
practice group.40 In the engagement letter between the firm and the gaming
corporation, the corporation requested that the firm ―pay[ ] especially close attention
to the securities related issues, as [the corporation was] frankly not very
knowledgeable to the securities area.‖41 The court stated that ―the letter appears to
limit [the firm‘s] representation . . . to securities-related issues . . . .‖42 The plaintiffs
claimed, however, that the firm ―had an obligation to review Indian gaming matters
as they arose in [its] representation of [the gaming corporation] and to adequately
address those issues in [its] opinion letter.‖43 The gaming corporation gave
conflicting signals concerning the scope of the firm‘s representation, with one
executive officer testifying that he did not specifically direct the firm to research or
not to research Indian gaming law.44
The plaintiffs based their suit on one false representation in the opinion
letter.45 The firm had opined in the letter that ―we knew of no material failure by the
[gaming corporation] to (i) comply with any laws, regulations and orders applicable
to its business . . . or (iii) comply with any state or federal judgment, decree, order,
statute, rule or regulation applicable to or binding upon the [gaming corporation].‖ 46
In fact, the corporation was (allegedly) in violation of federal Indian gaming law, and
federal agents raided the corporation‘s offices, seizing company records, books, and
computer equipment.47 The plaintiffs claimed that the failure of the subsidiary and

39

See id. at *5.

40

Id. at *5-*6.

41

Id. at *5.

42

Id. at *5-*6.

43

Id. at *6.

44

Id. at *7 n.4.

45

Id. at *11-*12.

46

Id. at *9.

47

Id. at *11.
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the subsequent loss of their investments resulted due to public disclosure of the
gaming corporation‘s alleged violations of federal law.48
The court granted the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment, holding as
a matter of law that plaintiffs‘ reliance on the opinion letter was unreasonable and
that any alleged misrepresentations in the opinion letter did not proximately cause
the investment loss.49 Thus, the court never reached whether the scope of the firm‘s
representation included Indian gaming law.50 The court hinted at the result,
however, by calling plaintiff‘s claim that the representation included Indian gaming
law ―questionable.‖51 In addition, the court noted that the engagement letter
between the firm and corporation seemed to limit the firm‘s representation to
securities law.52
The court further stated that ―[a]s legal representative for the investors in this
transaction, [the lead plaintiff, who was both an investor and the attorney for the
investors] had the unique opportunity to negotiate statements from [the] defendants
that [the gaming corporation‘s] operations were in full compliance with federal
Indian gaming laws,‖ as opposed to just ―applicable laws.‖53 The court found the
plaintiffs‘ failure to avail themselves of this opportunity to be especially conspicuous
given that plaintiffs had negotiated an opinion letter from another lawyer that did
contain those affirmative representations.54 The court‘s analysis could indicate that
the term ―applicable laws‖ is not as broad as it may seem, although the court
assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion that the opinion covered
Indian gaming law.55 Thus, while it is plausible that an opinion covering ―applicable
laws‖ would indeed cover applicable Indian gaming laws, the court‘s language
suggests that the phrase ―applicable laws‖ might not cover all laws that would seem
to be applicable—especially if another opinion letter in the same transaction
specifically addressed certain applicable bodies of law.56 The court highlighted the
48

Id.

49

Id. at *24, *30.

50

Id. at *20 n.10.

51

Id.

52

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

53

Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 at *22-*23.

54

Id.

55

Id. at *22-*23, *20 n.10.

56

See id. at *22-*23.
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limitations of the firm‘s opinion letter, declaring that it ―only provides a negative
assurance, limited to [the firm‘s] knowledge, that [it] ‗know[s] of no material failure
by [the gaming corporation] to comply . . . with applicable laws . . . and state and
federal statutes.‘‖57 The plaintiffs‘ failure ―to negotiate affirmative assurances from
[the firm] concerning [the gaming corporation]‘s compliance with federal Indian
gaming laws‖ was one reason the court found the plaintiffs‘ reliance on the opinion
letter to be unreasonable as a matter of law.58
If the Day case had not ended with summary judgment, it seems likely that
the court would have determined that the firm‘s representation did not extend to
Indian gaming law and, thus, there was no false representation of compliance with
Indian gaming laws in the opinion.59 The firm and the attorney may have avoided
litigation altogether, however, by explicitly providing in the opinion letter what
bodies of law the opinion did and did not cover.60 If the opinion letter specifically
provided that it only applied to securities law or that it did not apply to Indian
gaming law, any claim that the opinion was false or misleading in regards to Indian
gaming law would obviously fail. To avoid liability, third-party opinions should
include a provision ―that states what law is covered by the closing opinion.‖61 Such
provisions are ―strictly construed to exclude responsibility for any other law.‖62
The opinion letter at issue in Day did include a provision stating that it was
―limited ‗to the laws of the State of Minnesota, the Delaware General Corporation
Law, and the federal laws of the United States of America.‘‖63 It did not, however,
state what federal laws did not apply. The firm could have prevented the lawsuit by
simply (1) informing the plaintiffs that the opinion letter would not address Indian
gaming law64 and (2) stating in the opinion letter that the opinion was applicable only
57

Id. at *23.

Id. at *24 (―[T]he Court finds that under the facts and circumstances of this case—the opinion
letter‘s disclosures, plaintiffs‘ access to the relevant information and Day‘s ability, as legal
representative, to negotiate affirmative assurances from defendants concerning [the gaming
corporation]‘s compliance with federal Indian gaming laws—plaintiffs‘ reliance was unreasonable as a
matter of law.‖); see infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Day case.
58

59

See supra text accompanying note 50.

60

See FIELD & SMITH, supra note 25, at § 3.7.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 at *8.

Normally, the opinion recipient will tell issuing counsel what law should be covered in the opinion.
See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 10, at 215-16 (―To avoid misunderstandings, the
64
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to securities law matters and that it ―express[ed] no opinion with respect to [any
other] matters.‖65
B. Accord Opinions
If an opinion letter has adopted the Accord, it is generally much easier to
define the scope of the opinion.66 The Accord is a collection of various assumptions,
limitations, and interpretations that governs all opinions that adopt it. 67 It was
promulgated by the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association in 1991
as a way for opining counsel to standardize opinion letters and incorporate many of
the customary assumptions and limitations in their opinions implicitly.68 Developed
in response to the confusion that plagued opinion givers and recipients over the
meaning of opinion provisions, the Accord is ―a detailed set of rules that define[ ] for
those who [choose] to adopt them how an opinion letter should be interpreted, the
laws it should be understood to cover, the factual investigation the opinion giver [is]
expected to conduct and the meaning of several standard opinion clauses.‖69
Adopting the Accord would generally prevent the questions present in Day
concerning the scope of an opinion letter.70 Section 18 of the Accord provides that
an opinion that adopts it ―deals only with the specific legal issues it explicitly
addresses.‖71 Section 19 states that an adopting opinion ―does not address any of the
following legal issues unless the Opinion Giver has explicitly addressed the specific
legal issue in the Opinion Letter.‖72 Section 19 then lists eighteen different types of

Opinion Recipient is expected to specify to the Opinion Giver, in reasonable detail, the legal issues
that the Opinion Recipient desires be addressed.‖). If issuing counsel does not plan to address any of
the issues requested by recipient, it should so state. See id.
65

Id. at 221.

66

See In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

67

Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 170.

68

See Infocure, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, 169.

See Glazer, supra note 3, at 34. Although the Accord was created as a way to bring uniformity to
opinion letter interpretation, adoption in opinions is not common. As noted by Glazer, ―[t]he Accord
never caught on in major financial centers.‖ Id.
69

70

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

71

Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 214.

72

Id. at 215-16.
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legal issues from federal securities law to federal and state labor laws and
regulations.73
In In re Infocure Securities Litigation, plaintiffs attempted to bolster their claims
of securities fraud and breach of contract by arguing that an opinion letter from
opposing counsel addressed securities law.74 Because the opinion letter adopted the
Accord, however, it was clear that securities law was beyond the scope of the
opinion.75 The court declared that ―an [o]pinion [l]etter subject to the ABA Accord
contains many limitations on its scope‖ and that the letter at issue ―does not relate to
[a corporation‘s] overall compliance with securities laws.‖76 The court also stated
that such an opinion letter ―simply confines itself to the execution of the transaction
documents and the obligations thereunder.‖77
II. WHEN THE LAW IS UNCLEAR OR SUBJECT TO CHANGE
Opinion-issuing counsel may be concerned when the law at issue is unclear
or subject to change. Lawyers are often asked to issue an opinion regarding wellestablished law, but are sometimes asked to give an opinion regarding law that is
either ambiguous or in a state of flux.78 While some lawyers may elect to forgo
issuing opinions in such situations,79 opinions are often still required to close the
deals.
A lawyer‘s representations (1) that her client and the transaction at issue do
not violate the law and (2) that the transaction is enforceable under applicable law are
based on the lawyer‘s perception of the current state of the law. If the law cannot be
accurately perceived or is likely to change after the opinion has been issued, a ―no
73

Id.

74

In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

75

Id. at 1358.

76

Id.

77

Id.

See generally Day v. Dorsey & Whitney, No. 98-1425, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149 (D. Minn. Feb.
21, 2001), aff’d, 21 F.App‘x 530 (8th Cir. 2001) (law allegedly covered by the opinion letter was unclear
at the time of issuance).
78

There is an argument that it would be unfair to ask lawyers to give a legal opinion in this situation.
The American Bar Association‘s Committee on Legal Opinion‘s ―Golden Rule‖ is that ―[a]n opinion
giver should not be asked to render an opinion that counsel for the opinion recipient would not
render if it were the opinion giver and possessed the requisite expertise.‖ Committee on Legal
Opinions, supra note 11, at 878.
79
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violation‖ or ―enforceability‖ opinion may be inaccurate. Of course, because lawyers
are not expected to possess psychic qualities, they are not required to accurately
predict the future state of the law. According to the American Bar Association‘s
Committee on Legal Opinions, both Accord and non-Accord opinion letters ―speak[
] as of [their] date. An opinion giver has no obligation to update an opinion letter
for subsequent events or legal developments.‖80 Thus, the problem is not that the
law is uncertain or likely to change; the real problem is how to issue such an opinion.
As is often the case, honesty is the best policy.
In Day v. Dorsey & Whitney, the firm‘s opinion that the corporation complied
with all applicable laws was subject to an exception provided in an exhibit of the
agreement.81 Exhibit B included any matters that could cause the corporation to be
in violation of an applicable law.82 Although the law firm did not consider its
opinion to include Indian gaming law, Exhibit B disclosed that the corporation‘s
Indian gaming operations could contravene the law in some states. 83 At the time of
issuance, the legality of the corporation‘s operations under Indian gaming law,
though supposed, was unclear.84 Exhibit B provided a relevant Supreme Court case
and federal statute that indicated the probable legality of the gaming operations but
cautioned that the corporation‘s operations could still be halted by state action.85
In addition to the information in Exhibit B, plaintiffs also received a letter
from one of the corporation‘s executive officers and the corporation‘s Form 10-K.
Both stated the possibility that the corporation‘s gaming operations could violate the
law.86 Even though the opinion indicated that the gaming operations were probably
free from legal challenge under Supreme Court case law, the disclosure of possible
invalidity prevented a reasonable reliance on that opinion.87 Importantly, the court
found that the opinion letter disclosures were relevant to the firm‘s avoidance of
Id.; see Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 8, at 196 (―The Opinion Giver has no obligation to
advise the Opinion Recipient (or any third party) of changes of law or fact that occur after the date of
the Opinion Letter—even though the change may affect the legal analysis, a legal conclusion or an
informational confirmation in the Opinion.‖).
80

81

Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149, at *8-*9.

82

Id.

83

Id. at *9-*10.

84

See id.

85

Id.

86

See id. *21-*22.

87

See id. *21-*24.
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liability, despite the fact that the letter did not specify which laws the client was
potentially violating.88
According to the court, ―the opinion letter contained express warnings to
investors regarding the potential risks of their investment.‖89 Quoting another case,
the court further stated that ―plaintiffs‘ reliance [is] unreasonable where the letter
‗raise[s] more red flags about the investment than gives assurance . . . .‘‖ 90
Considering ―the opinion letter‘s disclosures, plaintiffs‘ access to the relevant
information [in the letter from the corporation‘s executive and the Form 10-K] and
Day‘s ability, as legal representative, to negotiate affirmative assurances from
defendants concerning [the corporation‘s] compliance[,] . . . plaintiffs‘ reliance was
unreasonable as a matter of law.‖91
Thus, as illustrated in Day, when issuing an opinion regarding law that is
unclear or subject to change, a lawyer should state in the opinion that the law is
unclear or subject to change.92 As an added precaution, this disclosure could be
documented in other correspondence between the client and third party. In Day, the
opinion letter specifically provided that the corporation‘s games could be removed
from casinos, and plaintiffs had a letter from the corporation and the corporation‘s
Form 10-K that provided the same.93 The more sophisticated an opinion recipient,
the more likely that a disclosure in the opinion will suffice to protect an opining
attorney from liability: ―[I]n evaluating the reasonableness of plaintiffs‘ reliance, the
Court asks not whether the representations would deceive the average person, but
rather whether the representations would deceive ‗a person of the capacity and
experience of the particular [plaintiff].‘‖94

88

Id. at *23.

89

Id. at *24.

90

Id. (quoting Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1993)).

91

Id.

This, of course, would comply with one of the first ―guidelines‖ in issuing third-party opinions—
not to mislead the recipient. ―An opinion giver should not render an opinion that the opinion giver
recognizes will mislead the recipient with regard to the matters addressed by the opinions given.‖
Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 876.
92

93

See Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149, at *10, *21-*22.

Day, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26149, at *21 (quoting Berg v. Xerxes Southdale Office Bldg. Co., 290
N.W.2d 612, 616 (Minn. 1980)); see also In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1359
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (―I see no compelling public policy justification for disregarding disclaimers in third
94
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III. DEFINITION OF SUBJECTIVE TERMS
In addition to the scope of representation and the certainty of governing law,
opining counsel should pay particular attention to the definition of subjective terms
contained in their opinion letters. This is especially true in opinions that do not
adopt the Accord and, therefore, do not have a set of rules that guide
interpretation.95 When the meaning of certain words or phrases is ambiguous, it is
likely that different parties will interpret the words or phrases differently.96 When
interpretations differ, litigation may follow.97
A. “To Our Knowledge”
Perhaps the most common phrase in any document involving factual
representations is ―to our knowledge.‖98 The phrase ―to our knowledge‖ is a
standard limitation that restricts the breadth of the representation being made.99
Instead of certifying that certain facts are true, a representation that includes the
clause ―to our knowledge‖ simply states that the party making the representation
does not know that certain facts are untrue.100 Although the ambiguity in this phrase
is not readily apparent, a quick look at opinion letter case law reveals uncertainty in
application.101 One of the main areas of uncertainty involves the degree of
investigation required before making a representation to one‘s knowledge. Another
concern involves the scope of knowledge that opining counsel is expected to
possess.102

party opinion letters in complex transactions involving sophisticated businessmen all of whom have
their own independent counsel.‖).
95

See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.

The ABA acknowledged this in its promulgation of the Accord. The ABA intended to produce a
document that would prevent the frequent misunderstandings between parties over the interpretation
of opinion letter provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (explaining the creation and
adoption of the Accord).
96

97

See infra Part III, A, B.

98

See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 879; Berman, supra note 14, at 20.

99

See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 879.

100

See id.

101

See generally Berman, supra note 14, at 20-22 (examining conflicting opinion letter case law).

102

See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 879; Berman, supra note 14, at 21-22.

84

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 10

The American Bar Association states in its Guidelines for the Preparation of
Closing Opinions (―ABA Guidelines‖), created for opinions that do not adopt the
Accord:103
To avoid a possible misunderstanding over the meaning of
―knowledge,‖ the opinion preparers should consider describing in the
opinion letter the factual inquiry they have conducted (for example,
by stating what they intend ―to our knowledge‖ to mean or by
indicating that they are rendering the opinion based solely on their
personal knowledge without making any inquiry).104
Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi105 illustrates that even a definition of ―to our
knowledge‖ in the opinion letter may not fully protect opining counsel.
In Dean Foods, a law firm and three attorneys were sued for negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, and violation of a Massachusetts unfair practices act in
connection with a third-party opinion letter.106 The plaintiff had contracted to buy
stock in a holding company that held all of the stock of the firm‘s client.107 As a
condition to consummation of the stock purchase, the defendant issued the plaintiff
a ―no litigation‖ opinion (i.e., an opinion stating that the firm‘s client was not
threatened by any pending or potential litigation).108 The opinion at issue
represented:
To our knowledge, except as set forth in Schedule 2.10 of the
Company Disclosure Schedule, there is no claim, action, suit,
litigation, proceeding, arbitration or, [sic] investigation of any kind, at
law or in equity (including actions or proceedings seeking injunctive
relief), pending or threatened against the Company or any of its
subsidiaries and neither the Company nor any of its subsidiaries is
subject to any continuing order of, consent decree, settlement
agreement or other similar written agreement with, or continuing
103

Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 875.

104

Id. at 878.

105

No. Civ. A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 301944 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004).

106

Id. at *11.

Id. at *6. Although the plaintiff in this case is really a group of ―corporately related‖ entities, for
the purposes of the case, all function together as a single company. Id. at *1.
107

108

Id. at *7.
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investigation by, any Governmental Entity, or any judgment, order,
writ, injunction, decree or award of any Governmental Entity or
arbitrator, including, without limitation, cease-and-desist or other
orders.109
In defining ―to our knowledge,‖ the opinion letter stated:
With respect to matters stated to be ‗to our knowledge,‘ we call your
attention to the fact that we have not made any independent review
or investigation of agreements (other than those expressly referred to
herein), instruments, orders, writs, judgments, rules, regulations or
decrees by which our clients or any of their properties may be bound,
nor have we made any investigations as to the existence of actions,
suits, investigations or proceedings, if any, pending or threatened
against our clients, except to the extent that any of the above is
disclosed in any exhibit or schedule to the Purchase Agreement.
However, nothing has come to our attention which causes us to
doubt the accuracy of such exhibits or schedules.110
The firm further stated in the opinion letter that ―[i]n rendering our opinions we
have examined such materials as we have deemed relevant to those opinions . . . .‖ 111
When the firm issued the opinion, the firm knew that its client‘s records had been
subpoenaed by a grand jury in connection with a case involving the client‘s rebate
program.112 The firm also knew that the Assistant U.S. Attorney was investigating
the legality of the client‘s rebate program.113 Nowhere in Schedule 2.10 or in any
other schedule or exhibit to the agreement did the firm disclose the grand jury
subpoena or rebate investigation.114
Three years after the opinion letter was issued, the firm‘s client pled guilty to
conspiracy to commit tax evasion in connection with its rebate program.115 The plea
109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id. at *1,*8,*10.

113

Id. at *2, *9-*10.

114

Id. at *8; see id. at *10.

115

Id. at *10.
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resulted in a fine of over seven million dollars.116 The plaintiff sued the firm and
attorneys involved for the misrepresentations in the opinion, arguing that it would
not have purchased stock in the client‘s company had it known of the grand jury
subpoena and rebate investigation.117 Although the firm‘s defense was not entirely
clear, one of the litigators in the firm asserted that he did not accurately comprehend
what matters needed to be included in the opinion and that he was unaware the firm
was issuing an opinion letter regarding the client‘s criminal liability.118 Although the
court absolved the attorneys of individual liability, the court held the firm liable for
both common negligence and negligent misrepresentation.119
The court began its analysis of the case by exploring the meaning of thirdparty opinions in general.120 Quoting § 95(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, the court declared: ―In furtherance of the objectives of a client
in representation, a lawyer may provide to a nonclient the results of the lawyer‘s
investigation and analysis of facts or the lawyer‘s professional evaluation or opinion
on the matter.‖121 The court also quoted § 95(3), which states: ―[i]n providing the
information, evaluation, or opinion under Subsection (1), the lawyer must exercise
care with respect to the nonclient . . . .‖122 The court then looked at the customary
standard of care.123 A court dealing with an opinion that adopted the Accord
probably would not need to look at customary practice to interpret meaning,124 but
the court here was forced to examine other sources to determine the breadth of the
third-party opinion in general and the no-litigation opinion in particular.125
Quoting the widely read and highly respected TriBar Opinion Committee
report, Third Party “Closing” Opinions (―TriBar Report‖), the court stated that ―[f]actual
information that is the subject of an opinion (e.g., no litigation) . . . must be
116

Id.

117

Id. at *10.

118

Id. at *9.

119

Id. at *23.

120

See id. at *11.

121

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95(1) (1998)).

122

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95(3) (1998)).

123

Id. at *12.

See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (explaining that adoption of the Accord means that an
opinion will be subject to a defined list of assumptions, limitations, and interpretations).
124

125

Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *12.
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established in a way that meets the needs of the parties to the transaction.‖ 126 After
explaining that an opinion giver must use judgment in determining whether the
opinion conforms to customary practice of the locale, the court made it clear that the
opinion giver has an underlying responsibility to refrain from misleading the
recipient.127 Quoting the TriBar Report, the court explained:
When considering if an opinion to be given will mislead the opinion
recipient, opinion preparers must think not only about the opinion
itself but also about areas excluded from the opinion. . . . Inclusion of
the phrase ‗to our knowledge‘ in an opinion does not by itself . . .
state a limitation on the investigation required by customary
diligence.‖128
The court again quoted TriBar Report, stating:
The no litigation opinion is intended to elicit information regarding
the existence of pending and threatened actions and proceedings . . .
that might be of concern to the opinion recipient. . . . The presence
or absence of the phrase ‗to our knowledge‘ does not change the
meaning of the opinion. With or without ‗to our knowledge,‘ the
opinion does nothing more than provide comfort to the opinion
recipient that the opinion preparers do not know the list of litigation
referred to in the opinion letter to be incomplete or unreliable.129
The court found that the phrase ―to our knowledge‖ represents that the
opinion is accurate as to the knowledge of all of the lawyers in the firm, not just the
lawyers who actually prepared the opinion.130 Responding to the defendants‘
argument that the opinion was not prepared by the same group of lawyers who
handled the client‘s litigation matters, the court stated that ―[a]n opinion letter is
usually written on a law firm‘s letterhead and signed in the name of the firm. It thus

126

Id. at *13 (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 598).

127

Id.; see supra note 99 (explaining that honesty is the best policy).

128

Id. (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 602, 619).

129

Id. at *14 (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 664).

130

Id. at *13.
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purports to express the opinion of the firm, not merely that of the opinion
preparers.‖131 Additionally, the court stated:
The no-litigation opinion is based on the assumption that the opinion
giver has a special awareness of pending or threatened actions, a
special ability to verify their existence or nonexistence through client
records, or special ability to ask the right questions of the appropriate
people to determine that the certificate provided by the officers of
the company includes and appropriately describes all pending
actions.132
Significantly, it was of no consequence that the defendants did not believe
the grand jury subpoena and rebate investigation would result in criminal
prosecution.133 The court also again referenced the TriBar Report, holding that any
possible or pending actions should be disclosed in the no litigation opinion.134 The
court explained that these matters must be included even if presumably closed:
There is a dramatic difference in asking a lawyer . . . whether he
thinks a grand jury investigation has gone away, and asking him
whether his law firm can decline to reveal the grand jury investigation
in an opinion letter that confirms the absence of pending or
threatened investigations, while being embroidered with the nothinghas-come-to-our-attention-which-causes-us-to-doubt-the-accuracythereof language.135
Of course, the use of the phrase ―nothing has come to our attention which
causes us to doubt the accuracy of such exhibits or schedules‖ made the court‘s
analysis easier.136 This phrase makes the defendants‘ representation that they did not
know of any pending investigation much more explicit. As stated by the court:
In its Opinion Letter . . . [the law firm] not only failed to list in
Schedule 2.10 the . . . grand jury subpoena/rebate investigation, it went
131

Id. (citing TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 605).

132

Id. at *14.

133

See id. at *8 (stating that one defendant-lawyer‘s ―guesstimate[d]‖ that the matter had gone away).

134

See supra text accompanying note 129.

135

Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *17.

136

See supra text accompanying note 110.
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a significant step further when it affirmatively said: ―nothing has
come to our attention which causes us to doubt the accuracy
thereof.‖ These words—―nothing has come to our attention which
causes us to doubt the accuracy thereof‖—appear in the Opinion
Letter not just once, but twice.137
It is probable, however, that the absence of this phrase would not have
affected the end result of firm liability for common negligence and negligent
misrepresentation. After all, opinion givers have a general obligation not to mislead
opinion recipients,138 especially in no litigation opinions, which represent that there is
no undisclosed pending or threatened claim, action, suit, litigation, proceeding,
arbitration, or investigation.139 By issuing a no litigation opinion, a firm represents
that it does not know of any litigation and implicitly represents that it does not know
of any facts that might indicate possible litigation.
Examining the court‘s analysis in Dean Foods, there are several lessons for
lawyers who make factual representations in opinion letters. The primary lesson is
that the phrase ―to our knowledge,‖ no matter how defined, cannot transform the
meaning of a representation.140 Because an opinion letter should not mislead the
opinion recipient, the use of ―to our knowledge‖ will not free opining counsel from
liability for issuing an opinion that it had reason to know was not true.141
Another lesson found in Dean Foods is rather simple, but very important: if an
opinion letter is signed by a firm, the opinion is considered to be issued by the entire
firm and not just the lawyers who participated in drafting the opinion.142 ―To our
knowledge‖ in a firm-issued opinion means ―to the knowledge of all the lawyers in
this firm.‖143 If a firm represents a client in several different capacities, lawyers
drafting the opinion letter for the client should verify with other lawyers working for
the client that the opinion letter is accurate.144 ―There is no absolute requirement
137

Id. at *18.

138

See supra text accompanying note 130.

139

See supra text accompanying note 133.

140

See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.

141

See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *13.

142

See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.

143

See id.

144

See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *13.
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that every lawyer be consulted and every file reviewed. Informal consultations will
satisfy the due diligence inquiry, provided that the opinion preparer talks to the
appropriate people.‖145 The ability of opining counsel to lessen this duty of ―due
diligence inquiry‖ is another question for which Dean Foods has an intriguing answer.
Interestingly (and perhaps disturbingly), Dean Foods can be read to mean that
opinion preparers are always subject to duties imposed by customary diligence and
that the phrase ―to our knowledge‖ cannot limit those duties. If this is true, despite
any explanation of the meaning of ―knowledge‖ in the opinion, ―to our knowledge‖
may not ever be completely defined within the four corners of an opinion letter.
The American Bar Association instructs opining counsel to define the meaning of
―to our knowledge‖ as used in an opinion,146 but Dean Foods suggests that part of its
meaning may be dictated by customary practice beyond the express definition. 147
Thus, use of the phrase ―to our knowledge‖ may bind opining counsel to the
phrase‘s customary meaning, even when the opinion provides otherwise.
The Dean Foods court essentially stated that a firm making a factual
representation in an opinion letter has a customary duty to investigate the accuracy
of the representation as to all the lawyers within the firm, regardless of which
attorneys drafted the opinion, notwithstanding the ―to our knowledge‖ limitation.148
Understanding the facts of Dean Foods and the court‘s analysis, the court‘s
ruling that ―to our knowledge‖ does not limit the investigation required by
customary practice is probably not as broad as it seems. Although Dean Foods could
be read to mean that a ―to our knowledge‖ limitation does not limit those duties
imposed by customary practice, Dean Foods probably means that ―to our knowledge‖
cannot implicitly abrogate those obligations required by customary practice. When a
firm does not state whether it has investigated pursuant to customary diligence, the
firm will be held to the standard of customary diligence; on the other hand, when a
firm explicitly states that it did not complete the investigation required by customary
diligence, the firm probably would not be held to that standard. It is unlikely that the
Dean Foods court would find a firm liable if (1) the firm explicitly provided in the
opinion letter that its representations were limited to the knowledge of the actual

145

Berman, supra note 14, at 22.

146

See supra text accompanying note 111.

147

See supra text accompanying note 104.

148

See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *13.
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preparers and (2) the preparers did not possess actual knowledge concerning any
investigations.149
Dean Foods also teaches that required matters must be disclosed in an opinion
even if opining counsel thinks that the matters will be resolved.150 The obligation to
disclose certain matters to a third-party recipient remains even when opining counsel
believes disclosure is unimportant.151 Moreover, as evidenced by the facts of Dean
Foods, it may be hard to tell which matters are important. Undoubtedly, the court‘s
analysis of this issue was aided by the fact that an expert witness testified that it was
below a lawyer‘s standard of care to think that such matters were closed.
Dean Foods is also fascinating because the firm actually advised its client to
disclose the existence of the grand jury subpoena and rebate investigation in the
opinion letter.152 The client, however, decided against including the matters in the
opinion letter, fearful that disclosure would lead to interference with the stock
purchase by minority shareholders.153 In addition to the more analytical points
provided by this case, there is also a common sense tip: when a client desires to
exclude a matter from an opinion letter because of fear that disclosure will kill the
deal, counsel should know that that is the sort of matter that must be included.
Although Dean Foods is an unreported state court decision, its reasoning is based
on the TriBar Report, one of the premier sources of authority on third party
opinions.154 Thus, what could otherwise be considered an irrelevant decision offers
invaluable insight into how other courts would handle these issues.
This point is especially compelling due to the sophistication of the opinion recipients. See supra
notes 101 and accompanying text. In some situations, however, there may still be an argument that an
opinion letter by its nature imposes some duties that cannot be abrogated. According to the D.C.
Circuit Court, ―[u]nder the securities laws, a statement of opinion includes an implied representation
that the speaker rendered the opinion in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Good faith alone is
not enough. An opinion must have a reasonable basis, and there can be no reasonable basis for an
opinion without a reasonable investigation into the facts underlying the opinion.‖ Michael Sackheim,
Selected Ethical and Professional Responsibility Issues, 1642 PRAC. L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 129, 149 (2008) (citing Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
149

See supra text accompanying notes 141-44. See infra Part IV.B. for an extended discussion on an
opinion giver‘s duty to disclose.
150

151

See Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *17.
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Id. at *8.
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Id.
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See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Subjective Terms
As previously discussed, in a ―no litigation‖ opinion, opining counsel
represents that there is no threatened litigation. Often, however, there is confusion
as to what constitutes a ―threat‖ of litigation. Additionally, in a ―no litigation‖
opinion, opining counsel frequently provides that no threatened litigation exists that
could have a ―material adverse effect‖ on the client or the transaction. Often there is
confusion as to what is considered ―material.‖
In In re Infocure Securities Litigation,155 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
law firm did not disclose a threat of litigation in violation of the firm‘s ―no litigation‖
opinion.156 Plaintiffs claimed that a third party sent a letter threatening litigation
against the firm‘s client, creating a matter that required disclosure in the ―no
litigation‖ opinion.157 The district court, however, considered the letter to be a
demand letter and stated that a demand letter was not a ―threat‖ of litigation. 158 A
demand letter is defined as ―[a] letter by which one party explains its legal position in
a dispute and requests that the recipient take some action (such as paying money
owed), or else risk being sued.‖159 The court pointed out that the letter in this case
contained only a demand and did not contain any express threat of future
litigation.160 Moreover, the third party who sent the letter testified at trial that he
had, in fact, agreed to cooperate with the client and did not threaten litigation by his
letter.161
The court in In re Infocure Securities Litigation did not explain why a demand
letter did not constitute a threat of litigation despite the fact that demand letters are
210 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2002). See supra notes 74-77 for an earlier discussion of Infocure
Securities.
155

156

Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.

157

Id.

Id. (―Moreover, a fair reading of the December 21, 1999, letter from Hafner‘s counsel is that it was
a demand letter, not a threat of litigation.‖).
158

159

BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 462-63 (8th ed. 2004).

Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (―Although Hafner‘s attorney demands the registration of
his client‘s shares in accordance with the Registration Rights Agreement, he makes no threat of
litigation in the December 21, 1999, letter.‖).
160

Id. (―[The law firm] was expressly told and understood from the Infocure executives who were in
direct contact with Hafner, that he had acquiesced in the delay in registration of his shares, and that
he was not threatening litigation.‖).
161
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typically sent to ask the recipient to resolve a dispute ―or else risk being sued.‖ 162
Rather, the court merely distinguished between a demand letter and a threat of
litigation without explaining the distinction.163 The court‘s readiness to find a
demand letter not a threat of litigation hinged on the peculiar facts of that case.
Despite the general nature of demand letters, the demand letter at issue never
mentioned litigation, and the sender admitted that he agreed to the client‘s actions
and was not threatening litigation.164
The court‘s quick dismissal of a ―demand letter‖ as not a threat of litigation
fails to provide guidance for a case in which a demand letter actually contains
language expressly or implicitly discussing potential litigation, particularly when the
client is unable or unwilling to comply with the letter‘s demands. Uncertainty also
exists in cases where the person who sent the letter testifies at trial that he intended
the letter to serve as a threat of litigation. To avoid uncertainty over a court‘s
definition of a ―threat‖ of litigation in different circumstances, opining counsel
should define what constitutes a ―threat‖ and specify what qualities a communication
must possess in order for it qualify.165
The most obvious way opining counsel can restrict the breadth of the term
―threat‖ is to provide that only written threats must be disclosed.166 The opinion
letter at issue in In re Infocure Securities Litigation, having adopted the Accord, contained
such a provision.167 The Accord provides that only written threats must be disclosed
in a ―no litigation‖ opinion.168 According to the Accord, ―[b]ecause it is so often
difficult to judge whether oral communications regarding disputes constitute actual
threats of legal proceedings, the confirmation in the Opinion Letter relates only to
legal proceedings that have been overtly threatened by a written communication.‖ 169
162

See supra text accompanying note 159.

163

See supra note 158.

164

See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.

The ―no litigation‖ opinion at issue in In re Infocure Securities appears to use ―Threatened‖ as a
defined term. See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
165

See id. at 1360 (stating that only written threats must be disclosed under the language of the ―no
litigation‖ opinion).
166

See id. at 1361 (―The ABA Accord clearly limits the confirmation of the threatened litigation to
written communications.‖); see supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that the opinion letter
adopted the Accord).
167

168

Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.

169

Id. (quoting Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 10, at 213).
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Therefore, it is good practice to include a similar provision in ―no litigation‖
opinions that do not adopt the Accord.
Similarly, opining counsel may limit what constitutes a threat to specifically
defined language. To help prevent a claim like that in In re Infocure Securities Litigation,
opining counsel should provide that a threat does not exist unless there is an express
(as opposed to implicit) warning of litigation. Opining counsel should clearly state
that a threat of litigation is an explicit warning of a suit, arbitration, action, claim,
complaint, grievance, investigation, or proceeding if certain action is not taken or if
certain action continues. This approach is similar to the Accord, which provides that
a threat of litigation in a ―no litigation‖ opinion refers only to those ―legal
proceedings overtly threatened by a written communication.‖170 The opinion letter
at issue in In re Infocure Securities Litigation adopted the Accord and, thus, provided that
only overt threats could constitute a ―threat‖ within the meaning of the opinion
letter.171 While such a provision did not prevent litigation, it prevented the court
from ruling against the firm. Although it may not be worth the extra time and
expense in every situation, the more specifically the word ―threat‖ is defined, the
more certain opining counsel will be as to its interpretation. After In re Infocure
Securities Litigation, opining counsel should consider expressly stating that a demand
letter does not constitute a threat of litigation.
In addition to the word ―threat,‖ disagreements often arise concerning the
definition of ―material.‖ ―No litigation‖ opinions often state that pending or
threatened litigation must be disclosed only if it could have a ―material adverse
effect‖ or result in a ―material impairment‖ to the parties or the transaction.172 When
the word ―material‖ is used by multiple parties to a transaction, each party probably
has its own idea as to what is, in fact, material.
Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―material‖ as ―[o]f such a nature that
knowledge of the item would affect a person‘s decision-making; significant;
essential.‖173 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 states that a matter is material
if:

170

Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 8, at 213.

171

See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.

See, e.g., id.; Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000-00296, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS
142, at *5-*6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004).
172

173

BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (8th ed. 2004).
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(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason
to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as
important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable
man would not so regard it.174
In some situations, the materiality of an adverse effect or impairment would be
beyond question. For example, a billion dollar judgment against a party will probably
always be considered to have a material adverse effect or cause a material
impairment. A thousand dollar judgment could be material, however, if it affected a
contract central to a business‘s operations. Non-monetary judgments could be
considered material if they resulted in bad press for a corporation. Reasonable
minds could easily differ as to what constitutes ―material.‖
In National Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, LLP,* four banks who lent money
to a firm‘s client sued the firm after receiving and relying on the firm‘s opinion
letter.175 Alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, misrepresentation, breach
of contract, and violation of a Massachusetts state statute, the banks claimed that the
firm failed to disclose pending litigation involving its client as required by the firm‘s
―no litigation‖ opinion.176 The ―no litigation‖ opinion at issue stated:
To our knowledge, there is no action, suit, proceeding or
investigation pending or threatened against [our client] before any
court or governmental department, which could prevent the
consummation of the transactions contemplated . . . or which, if
adversely determined, could have a material adverse effect on the
business, condition, affairs or operations of [our client] or any
material impairment of the right or ability of [our client] to carry on
its operations as now conducted.177
When the firm issued its opinion, lawyers in the firm‘s litigation practice group knew
of a patent infringement suit against the client.178
174

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).

175

Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *1.

176

Id. at *1, *9-*10.

177

Id. at *5-*6.

178

Id. at *4.
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The firm argued that its failure to disclose the patent infringement suit did
not violate the ―no litigation‖ opinion because the suit would not have a material
adverse effect on its client even if adversely determined.179 A lawyer in the defendant
firm argued that, because the client was already using technology that did not involve
the patent at issue, an injunction prohibiting use of the patent would have little effect
on its client.180 The banks countered that the loan would have involved significantly
different terms or would not have been completed had they known about the patent
infringement litigation.181 Because a genuine issue of fact existed concerning the
likelihood of a material adverse effect resulting from the patent litigation, the banks‘
claim of misrepresentation survived summary judgment.182
Because of the subjectivity involved in the interpretation of ―material,‖ the
Accord provides that materiality should be defined using monetary amounts.183 It
states: ―[i]n order to avoid the uncertainties inherent in the meaning of materiality, it
is desirable, whenever possible, to limit confirmations regarding pending or
threatened legal proceedings seeking money damages to those exceeding an objective
monetary or other threshold.‖184 For opinions that do not adopt the Accord, the
ABA Guidelines provide assistance.185 They state that ―[w]hen possible, an opinion
giver should avoid use of a materiality standard by using objective criteria (for
example, a particular dollar amount, a specific category, or inclusion on a specified
list) when limiting the matters addressed by an opinion.‖186 ABA reports and
relevant case law suggest that opining counsel should refrain from using the word
―material‖ in its opinions. If opining counsel chooses to include the word, it should
be defined using objective criteria. Although a party cannot use monetary thresholds
as objective criteria when determining whether litigation involving equitable relief
must be disclosed,187 some objective criteria should be used. For example, the firm
in National Bank of Canada could have provided that only legal proceedings involving
179

Id. at *25.

180

Id.

181

Id. at *25-*26.

182

Id. at *26-*27.

183

Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 8, at 213.

Id. It further states that ―[t]his sort of limitation would not, of course, apply to legal proceedings
seeking equitable relief or otherwise to interfere with the Transaction.‖ Id.
184

185

See Committee on Legal Opinions, supra note 11, at 878.

186

Id.

187

See supra note 184.

2008]

WAIT… WHAT DID I JUST SAY?

97

more than $1 million or potentially enjoining its client from using currently
employed technology could be considered to have a material adverse effect on its
client.
IV. DUTY TO THIRD-PARTY RECIPIENT
One of the most important issues surrounding third-party opinions is
whether opining counsel owes a duty to the third-party recipient.188 Much of the
case law and secondary authority concerning third-party opinions directly or
indirectly address this question.189 For many claims, a duty to third-party recipients is
a prerequisite to finding lawyer liability.190 If opining counsel can successfully argue
that it does not owe a duty to third-party recipients, it may escape liability for what
would otherwise be a faulty opinion.191 In examining the potential liability associated
with issuing an opinion, opining counsel needs to determine what duties it may owe
to recipients.
Generally, third-party recipients claim that they are owed both the duty of
care and the duty of disclosure.192 A duty of care imposes an obligation to ―exercise
the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar
circumstances.‖193 A duty of disclosure requires lawyers to reveal information to a
third-party recipient when necessary to avoid misrepresentations caused by
omissions.194 All negligence claims, including negligent misrepresentation, require

See supra text accompanying notes 29-30 (discussing two Massachusetts trial courts that addressed
similar cases in the same year and resolved them differently). See also Berman, supra note 14, at 20.
188

See, e.g., In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1351-54 (N.D. Ga. 2002);
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y.
1992); Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072, *14-*23 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.3 (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (1998).
189

See, e.g., Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54 (showing that securities fraud claims require a
duty of disclosure to be owed to plaintiff); Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *14*23 (claims involving negligence require that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care).
190

See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54; Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142,
at *14-*23.
191

See, e.g., Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54; Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 605 N.E.2d at 320;
Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *14-*23.
192

193

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52.

194

See Infocure Securities, 210 F.Supp. 2d at 1350.
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plaintiffs to show that they are owed a duty of care by the defendants.195 Negligence
claims comprise a large percentage of the total claims against lawyers in opinion
letter litigation.196 Fraud claims, including fraudulent misrepresentation, often
require plaintiffs to show that they are owed a duty of disclosure by the
defendants.197 A third-party recipient who cannot show that opining counsel owed a
duty of care or disclosure may find it difficult to convince the court of liability.198
A. Duty of Care
Section 95 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
provides:
(1) In furtherance of the objectives of a client in a representation, a
lawyer may provide to a nonclient the results of the lawyer‘s
investigation and analysis of facts or the lawyer‘s professional
evaluation or opinion on the matter.
***
(3) In providing the information, evaluation, or opinion under
Subsection (1), the lawyer must exercise care with respect to the
nonclient to the extent stated in § 51(2) and not make false
statements . . . .199
195

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2008).

Although Infocure Securities did not involve a negligence claim, it did contain a legal malpractice
claim, which (like a negligence claim) requires the plaintiff to prove a duty of care owed by the
defendant. See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-70.
196

See Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-54 (requiring a duty to disclose in a securities fraud
claim); Freightliner, L.L.C. v. Whatley Contract Carriers, L.L.C., 932 So. 2d 883, 891 (Ala. 2005)
(requiring a duty to disclose in a fraudulent suppression claim); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
551 (requiring a duty to disclose in a misrepresentation claim); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 24
(2008) (requiring a duty to disclose in a constructive fraud claim).
197

Third-party recipients can assert claims other than those based on negligence, and not every fraud
or misrepresentation claim requires a plaintiff to show the duty of disclosure. See Nat’l Bank of Can.,
2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, at *23-*24 (not listing duty to disclose as an element of
misrepresentation under Massachusetts law). Because many cases regarding opinion letters involve
negligence, and many fraud and misrepresentation claims frequently require plaintiffs to show a duty
to disclose, the inability of third-party recipients to show a duty of care or disclosure significantly
lessens the ability to prevail against opining counsel.
198

199

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95.
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Section 51(2) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides
that a lawyer owes a duty of care ―to a nonclient when and to the extent that[ ] the
lawyer or (with the lawyer‘s acquiescence) the lawyer‘s client invites the nonclient to
rely on the lawyer‘s opinion or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so
relies . . . .‖200 Section 552(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.201
With such strong and clear language from the Restatement, many courts are
imposing a duty of care upon lawyers who issue third-party opinions.202 In the Dean
Foods case discussed in Part III, the court used the TriBar Report in addition to the
Restatement to support its holding that ―a professional duty is owed by the thirdparty opinion giver to the opinion recipient.‖203 The TriBar Report states that a
―third-party opinion recipient is entitled to rely only on what is stated in the opinion
letter,‖204 and that the ―recipient‘s ‗right to rely‘ means that a professional duty is
owed by opining counsel to the opinion recipient.‖205 The TriBar Report goes on to
say that, ―[a]s a result, in most jurisdictions, if the opinion is negligently given and
results in damage to the opinion recipient, the opinion recipient has a claim against
the opinion giver.‖206
Despite the Restatement, TriBar Report, and much of the case law, not all
courts impose a duty of care.207 As noted in the TriBar Report, ―[a] few jurisdictions
200

Id. at § 51(2).

201

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).

See Berman, supra note 14, at 21-22; Del O‘Roark, The Bermuda Triangle of Lawyer-Client-Nonclient, 59
KBA BENCH & BAR 32, 32-33 (1995), available at http://www.lmick.com/pdfs/bbfall95.pdf.
202

Dean Foods Co., 2004 WL 3019442, at *12 (quoting TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 2, at 604
n.29).
203

204

TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 604.

205

Id. at 604 n.29.

206

Id.

207

See infra text accompanying note 222.
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take the position that a professional cannot owe a duty to a non-client and, thus, that
a third-party opinion recipient has no standing to sue the opinion giver.‖208 In
National Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, a trial court decision discussed in Part
III, the court ruled that ―‗an attorney has no duty to a nonclient where the nonclient
has potentially conflicting interests with that of the attorney‘s client.‘‖209 The court
in National Bank of Canada expounded by stating that ―‗[t]he court will not impose a
duty of reasonable care on an attorney if such an independent duty would potentially
conflict with the duty the attorney owes to his or her client.‘‖210
The plaintiff-banks in National Bank of Canada claimed opining counsel was
liable for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, misrepresentation, breach of
contract, and violation of a state statute due to an allegedly false statement in a ―no
litigation‖ opinion.211 Both the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims
were disallowed, however, because the banks could not prove that the defendant
firm owed any duty of care.212 Acknowledging Section 552(1) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides that a professional may be liable for negligently
supplying false information for the guidance of others,213 the court nonetheless stated
that a negligence action can only be sustained where the professional owes a duty of
care to the recipient of the false information.214 The court found that the defendant
could not owe a duty to the banks because the interests of the banks and the
defendant‘s client conflicted.215 The firm‘s client:

208

TriBar Opinion Committee, supra note 1, at 604 n.29.

Nat‘l Bank of Can. v. Hale & Dorr, LLP, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072, *19-*20 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 28, 2004) (quoting McCormack v. Galego, No. CA 950837, 1996 WL 1312096, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1996)).
209

Id. at *15 (citing Lamare v. Basbanes, 636 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Mass. 1994); DeLuca v. Jordan, 781
N.E.2d 849, 857-58 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); McCarthy v. Landry, 678 N.E.2d 172, 174 (Mass. App. Ct.
1997)).
210

211

Id. at *1.

212

Id. at *13-*23.

Section 552(1) provides: ―One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for the pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the information.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
213

214

Nat’l Bank of Can., 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 142, *14-*16.

215

Id. at *20-*21.
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[W]as interested in acquiring money from the Banks and protecting
its collateral; the Banks were interested in loaning money to [the
client] and securing repayment of that debt.
Consequently,
competing interests exist[ed], thereby negating any duty the
Defendant would otherwise owe to the Banks as its non-clients with
which it engaged in a business transaction.216
According to the court, ―‗[i]t is well-established that attorneys owe no duty to their
client‘s adversary.‘‖217
National Bank of Canada is striking because it was decided in the face of the
Restatement, the TriBar Report, and existing opinion letter case law. In 1992, the
highest court of New York held that ―attorneys, like other professionals, may be held
liable for economic injury [to third parties] arising from negligent representation,‖
despite attorneys‘ ethical obligations to their clients.218 The court explicitly stated
that ―where . . . the negligent acts, i.e., the creation of an opinion letter and the
transmission of that letter to a third party for the party‘s own use, were carried out
by the lawyer at the client‘s express direction, . . . ethical considerations . . . are
insufficient reason to insulate attorneys from liability.‖219 Thus, a decade before
National Bank of Canada was decided, a court had already rejected client loyalty as
reason to find no duty of care to third parties.
National Bank of Canada does not appear to have started a ―duty of care‖
revolution in opinion letter liability, and the trend of imposing a duty of care on
opining counsel remains.220 In fact, just a few months after National Bank of Canada,
a trial court in the same state held that opining counsel owes a duty of care to an
opinion recipient because the recipient is entitled to rely on the opinion.221 National
Bank of Canada still provides guidance, however, because it illustrates the reasoning

216

Id.

217

Id. at *22 (quoting Lamare v. Basbanes, 636 N.E.2d 218, 219 (Mass. 1994)).

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320
(N.Y. 1992).
218

Id. On a related note, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.3 discusses when a lawyer, for ethical
reasons, should get her client‘s informed consent before issuing a third-party opinion. MODEL RULES
OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.3 (1983).
219

220

Berman, supra note 14, at 22.

221

See supra text accompanying note 30.
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courts may find persuasive in deciding the existence of a duty of care and
demonstrates that courts may still be open to persuasion on this issue.
B. Duty of Disclosure
Although not as common as cases involving duty of care,222 questions
concerning the existence of a duty to disclose also arise in opinion letter litigation. 223
Plaintiffs who claim that omissions in an opinion letter fraudulently misled them
generally have to prove that the issuing lawyer or firm had a duty to disclose the
omitted information.224 The court in In re Infocure Securities Litigation held that a law
firm did not have a duty to disclose omitted information to an opinion‘s third-party
recipients because the firm had no fiduciary obligation to a nonclient.225
Stating that ―[a law firm] can be liable for omissions . . . only if it had a duty
to disclose,‖ the court listed seven factors in determining whether an opinion giver
has a duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5.226 The factors are:
(1) ―[T]he relationship‖ between the parties; (2) their ―relative access
to the information‖ at issue; (3) ―the benefit derived by the
defendant‖ from the transaction; (4) the ―defendant‘s awareness of
[p]laintiff‘s reliance‖ on defendant in making its investment decision;
(5) ―the extent of the defendant‘s knowledge,‖ (6) ―the significance‖
of the omitted information; and (7) ―the extent of the defendant‘s
participation in the fraud.‖227
Considering that the ―[p]laintiffs [in this case] were represented by their own counsel
who had direct access to [the firm‘s client]‖ and that ―[t]heir counsel could have
asked any questions they wished about any of the information involved,‖ the court
determined that the factors did not impose a duty of disclosure on the law firm. 228
Similar to the reasoning in National Bank of Canada, the court stated that ―[n]o
222

See supra note 196 and accompanying text.

223

See In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1351-54 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

224

See supra note 197 and accompanying text.

225

Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.

Id. Rule 10b-5 is 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 and provides required elements for securities fraud. Id. at
1348.
226

227

Id. at 1351 (quoting Ziemba v. Cascade Int‘l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1206 (11th Cir. 2001)).

228

Id.
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attorney[-]client relationship existed between [the law firm] and Plaintiffs‖ and that
―[w]ithout a fiduciary obligation, it can hardly be said that the attorney for one party
owes a duty to the opposing party, who was represented by competent lawyers of his
own choice.‖229
In re Infocure Securities Litigation sheds some light on the factors a court will
consider when determining the existence of a duty of disclosure to opinion
recipients. Due to the number of factors in this test, however, there could be many
different results. For example, if an omission was unusually significant, a third-party
recipient may be owed a duty of disclosure even when represented by counsel. 230
Likewise, firms may not owe a duty of disclosure to an unrepresented party when
such party is sophisticated and has personal access to the relevant information. 231
Similar to the duty of care, it would be difficult to definitively state the law
surrounding the duty of disclosure. This Part merely attempts to show the reasoning
behind a court‘s decision and how lawyers may use this reasoning to protect
themselves from liability.
CONCLUSION
An exploration into opinion letter liability is a long, dark, and confusing path.
Relatively little case law or scholarly research exists, and the premier authorities
consist mainly of bar association reports and Restatements. Moreover, much of the
existing case law is unpublished and sometimes contradictory, providing lawyers little
guidance about precedent or the likely application of various rules. This Article
sought to analyze the relevant secondary authority and available case law as best
possible in order to provide a few warning signs for opining counsel drafting their
opinions.
Because a lawyer will generally not be held liable for an improper opinion
that was not within her scope of representation, defining the scope of an opinion
letter is fundamental.232 The next important step in avoiding liability is ensuring that
opinion recipients are aware if the subject law is unclear or likely to change.233 In
addition, opining counsel should either avoid the use of subjective language apt to
229

Id.

230

See supra text accompanying note 226 (listing factors).

231

Infocure Securities, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.

232

See supra Part I.

233

See supra Part II.
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lead to litigation over interpretation or define such subjective language specifically.234
Finally, lawyers may be able to avoid liability by realizing what duties they owe to
third-party recipients and studying the arguments in favor of finding that no duty
exists.235
There is more research to be done and many more cases to be litigated on
this issue. Hopefully, this Article provides enough insight into opinion letter liability
to allow a few opining counsel to sleep a bit more comfortably tonight. When they
wake up, we can remind them that ―we have only scratched the surface.‖236
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See supra Part III.

235

See supra Part IV.
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Lipson, supra note 2, at 126.

